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Abstract 
A core proposition of the resource-based view of the firm is that related diversification is more 
efficient than unrelated diversification. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence is usually described 
as mixed or unstable. We empirically examine three possible explanations for the nature of these 
findings. One is that they reflect measurement problems. Another is that they reflect a failure to 
take the resource-based view far enough in terms of recognizing firm heterogeneity. The third is 
that the resource-based view is misspecified: relatedness is not a significant determinant of effi-
ciency. We use a detailed line-of-business sample to examine these three explanations. Our find-
ings clearly indicate that the main problem is measurement, and we describe an approach to over-
coming these problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of corporate diversification in strategic management is arguably dominated by the 
resource based view (RBV). One may further argue that the core prediction of the RBV is that 
related diversification should be superior to unrelated diversification, ceteris paribus. The logic is 
compelling and simple; when firms diversify into unrelated industries, they are less likely to reap 
benefits from resources in their other industries. At the extreme, a diversified entrant may face no 
advantages over an upstart firm (but larger costs due to added complexity). Theoretically, these 
ideas date back to at least Penrose (1959), and empirically at least to Rumelt’s (1974) landmark 
study. Nevertheless, the current status is that most reviewers summarize the empirical findings 
regarding the benefits of related diversification as mixed or confusing (e.g. Hoskisson and Hitt, 
1990; Lemelin, 1982; Markides and Williamson, 1994, 1996; Reed and Luffman, 1986; and Rob-
ins and Wiersema, 1995, 2003).1  
This paper evaluates three possible explanations for why this core prediction of the RBV has 
not succeeded in producing consistent support. The first potential problem deals with measure-
ment: relatedness is notoriously difficult to capture empirically, particularly in large-sample re-
search. Relatedness is hard to measure because theory advices us that related diversification cre-
ates efficiency gains (over single-business firms and unrelated diversifiers) only if specific condi-
tions are met, and these conditions are largely unobservable. Under this view, then, the mixed 
empirical support for the relatedness hypothesis is driven by the inability to capture, empirically, 
the conditions under which relatedness adds value. We call this the measurement interpretation.  
A second possible explanation is that the empirical work does not take the RBV logic far 
enough. While the RBV-literature on competitive advantage stresses idiosyncratic, firm-specific 
                                                 
1 Arend (2006) argues that the RBV, more generally, has not been subject to adequate empirical scrutiny, due to 
problems defining the key concept of resources, measuring the conditions under which resources generate rents, and 
specifying which reources are primary. 
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resources (Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993), the RBV literature on corpo-
rate diversification - particularly the empirical work - tends to focus on industry-level relatedness 
(Markides and Williamson, 1994, 1996). This involves downplaying intra-industry differences in 
resource bundles. One may therefore suspect that the kind of relatedness that matters for per-
formance is idiosyncratic, firm-specific relatedness, and that this kind of relatedness is not closely 
correlated with industry-level relatedness. In other words, because firms differ in the resources 
they possess and managers differ in how they conceptualize relatedness (Stimpert and Duhaime, 
1997), the benefits from combining a given pair of industries are highly idiosyncratic and firm-
specific. Accordingly, one should not expect anything but mixed and inconsistent results when 
relatedness is treated as an abstract relationship between industries, unconnected to the specific 
characteristics of a given firm. Therefore, while we may gain little insight from focusing on the 
relationship between industries X and Y, it is meaningful to ask how the activities in industries X 
and Y are related in firm Z (Foss and Christensen, 2001). Under this interpretation, the mixed 
empirical findings are an artifact of the tendency to ignore firm-specific, unobservable character-
istics. We call this the idiosyncrasy interpretation.   
A third explanation is that the RBV is misspecified: relatedness, even correctly measured, is 
not a significant determinant of efficiency. Relatedness may not produce efficiency gains because 
managers are not pursuing efficiency, or because they systematically lack the information, cogni-
tive ability, or organizational tools to realize efficiency gains. Expansion into related industries 
can for example be motivated by market power (via mutual forbearance), entrenchment of in-
cumbent management, or the pursuit of other private benefits. Alternatively, the resource based 
view may assume too much rationality on the part of decision-makers to be empirically success-
ful. Decision-makers may be prone to herding or simple errors, obscuring the link between relat-
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edness and efficiency.  We collectively label such non-efficiency explanations the skeptic inter-
pretation.  
We examine these alternative explanations using a comprehensive sample of line-of-business 
data from the 1980s. First we compare the measurement interpretation to the idiosyncrasy inter-
pretation. Our first test asks whether decision makers act as if some combinations are inherently 
more beneficial than others and, if so, whether these combinations are effectively captured by 
conventional measures of relatedness. We find that some combinations are clearly and systemati-
cally perceived to be more attractive than others. In other words, the revealed preferences of deci-
sion makers indicate that relatedness is not predominantly firm specific. We also find that con-
ventional approaches to measuring relatedness using to distances in the SIC system do not effec-
tively capture the kinds of relatedness that decision makers care about.  
A possible objection is that while the choice of combinations may be systematic, the perform-
ance resulting from these combinations is idiosyncratic. Our second test investigates the perform-
ance consequences of particular combinations. Is there a systematic relationship between related-
ness and performance, or is performance firm specific? Moreover, if performance is systemati-
cally associated with relatedness, do conventional SIC-based measures capture this association 
effectively? Our results suggest that relatedness and performance are systematically associated, 
indicating that the performance effects of particular industry combinations are not entirely firm 
specific. Again, we also find that the SIC-based measures seem to do a poor job of capturing 
these associations. Taken as a whole, these results favor the measurement interpretation over the 
idiosyncrasy interpretation.  
Next we pit the measurement interpretation against the skeptic interpretation. Even if related-
ness is unimportant, could certain combinations of industries appear more frequently in the data 
due to herding (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992) or mutual forbear-
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ance (Edwards, 1955; Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985)? The performance effects described above 
suggest that herding is not driving our empirical findings. To see if mutual forbearance explains 
the decision to diversity into certain industries but not others, we examine the relationship be-
tween relatedness and target-industry concentration. Mutual forbearance provides a motive for 
entry only if industry concentration exceeds some minimum threshold. If our results are driven by 
a mutual forbearance motive, relatedness should be a better predictor of entry into concentrated 
industries than more fragmented ones. We find that this is not the case. 
 Overall, our evidence suggests that there are significant and stable efficiency effects of relat-
edness, and that decision makers do act in a manner consistent with the pursuit of such effects. 
Contrary to the idiosyncrasy interpretation, these efficiency effects are not entirely firm specific, 
so that looking at inter-industry relatedness makes sense. Moreover, traditional approaches to 
relatedness using SIC distances seem to do a poor job of capturing the relatedness that drives 
diversification decisions and their outcomes. While both the idiosyncrasy and skeptic interpreta-
tions have merit, our results point to measurement problems as the main reason why empirical 
research on relatedness has produced mixed and confusing findings.  
 
THE THEORETICAL CASE FOR A MEASUREMENT INTERPRETATION 
We suggested above that relatedness matters only when particular theoretical conditions are 
met, and that conventional measures of relatedness may not capture these conditions very well. 
The theory of scope economies suggests that three basic conditions must be met for relatedness to 
create value. First, the diversifying firm must possess some resources that are functional substi-
tutes for the resources in the target industry. Second, these resources must be at least partly indi-
visible, leaving single-business firms and unrelated diversifiers with costly excess capacity (Pen-
rose, 1959). If these resources are not fully exploited in the firm’s existing businesses, they may 
 5
What's the Matter with Relatedness? 
be deployable at low marginal cost in a new business. Conversely, without excess capacity, a 
diversified firm would have no advantages over an independent startup and could face entry costs 
not born by incumbents in the destination industry.  
Third, there must be transaction costs in the market for excess capacity. As Teece (1980, 
1982) points out, while the existence of such indivisibilities explains joint production, it does not 
explain why joint production must be organized within a single firm. If the excess capacity cre-
ated by indivisibilities can be traded in markets, single-business firms and unrelated diversifiers 
can simply sell or rent out their excess capacity, or buy the capacity they need from other firms. 
In other words, absent transactional difficulties, two separate firms could simply contract to share 
the inputs, facilities, or whatever accounts for the relevant scope economies. If they do not, it 
must be because the costs of writing or enforcing such a contract are greater than the benefits 
from joint production. Whether the firms will integrate thus depends on the comparative costs 
and benefits of contracting, not on the underlying production technology. Indeed, if contracting 
costs are low, the related diversifier may actually compete at a disadvantage relative to the single-
business firm, because the diversified firm faces the additional bureaucratic costs of low-powered 
incentives, increased complexity, and so on (Williamson, 1985).2 
More recent attention has focused not on resource substitutability, but resource comple-
mentarity (Christensen and Foss, 1997; Foss and Christensen, 2001; Larsson and Finkelstein, 
                                                 
2 Recent literature emphasizes dynamic complementarities, the ability to identify new ways of combining existing 
resources or speed up the development of new resources. The benefits to similarity in this context arise because such 
dynamic complementarities may be greater if the industries in question share some basic features (March, 1991), or 
because some common characteristics facilitate their exploitation (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Prahalad and 
Bettis, 1985). The degree of dynamic complementarity between industries thus depends on the balance between 
variety and similarity (Christensen and Foss, 1997). Industries with appropriate balances between variety and simi-
larity produce larger dynamic complementarities than industries that are too different or too similar. Empirically, this 
implies that portfolios of businesses with strong inter-industry complementarities should be considered related (or, in 
Teece et al.’s [1994] language, “coherent”), and that firms with related activities should outperform firms with unre-
lated combinations of activities and single-business firms, ceteris paribus (again, assuming positive contracting 
costs).  
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1999; Teece, Rumelt, Dosi and Winter, 1994). Complementarities exist when investment in one 
industry increases the value of resources used in another industry, or when decisions about re-
source use in one industry affect similar decisions in another. These positive spillovers create a 
quantitative and qualitative coordination problem which may be best managed within a diversi-
fied firm (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Richardson, 1972). To explain why this coordination 
problem cannot be solved in the market (i.e., between single-business firms or unrelated diversi-
fiers), we must appeal to some form of contracting costs. Hence, transaction costs are also rele-
vant to situations involving complements. 
In sum, similarity among a diversified firm’s industries should not provide efficiency advan-
tages unless accompanied by indivisibilities (either in the form of productive capacity or positive 
spillovers) and transaction costs. Unfortunately, as discussed below, capturing these conditions 
empirically is difficult.  
 
Problems with conventional measures of relatedness 
The most common measures of relatedness in existing research are categorical measures and 
continuous SIC-based measures. However, neither effectively captures the conditions described 
above under which relatedness should lead to performance improvements. 
Categorical measures. The categorical approach, most closely associated with Rumelt (1974), 
is perhaps the best-known attempt to capture relatedness. Based on three ratios, Rumelt classified 
diversification strategies into four broad categories (nine if subcategories are included): single-
business firms, dominant-business firms, related firms, and unrelated firms. The ratios used for 
classification are the specialization ratio (the proportion of a firm’s revenue attributable to its 
largest single business), the related ratio (the proportion of a firm’s revenue attributable to its 
largest group of related businesses), and the vertical ratio (the proportion of a firm’s revenue aris-
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ing from all byproducts, intermediate products, and end products of a vertically integrated se-
quence of processing activities). 
A drawback of this procedure is that the classification of businesses into related and unre-
lated—needed to compute the related ratio—is done subjectively, using similarities in inputs, 
production technology, distribution channels and customers (Markides and Williamson, 1996; 
Robins and Wiersema, 1995). Besides the reliability of the subjective element in the classifica-
tions, this procedure also measures relatedness on a nominal level, only allowing comparisons 
within group averages.3
Moreover, this procedure mainly captures the degree to which resources are potential substi-
tutes across industry boundaries, which is only the case when there are large similarities in inputs, 
production technology, distribution channels and customers. These measures do not capture indi-
visibilities, which determine whether excess capacity is likely to develop, nor do they incorporate 
any notion of transaction costs impeding coordination between firms. Because both indivisibili-
ties and transaction costs are necessary for economies of scope to benefit related diversifiers, 
these measures are prone to exaggerate relatedness in some instances (i.e., where resources are 
close substitutes, but these additional conditions are not met). The implicit focus on similarities 
and economies of scope also raises the concern that such a procedure may not capture (dynamic) 
complementarity well, which implies that it will underestimate relatedness in other instances 
(Foss and Christensen, 2001).  
Continous SIC-based measures. Continuous SIC-based measures are currently the most popu-
lar relatedness variables in the strategy literature (Robins and Wiersema, 2003). These include the 
entropy index (Jaquemin and Berry, 1979), the concentric index (Caves, Porter and Spence, 
                                                 
3 Determining the extent to which activities are vertically related also involves subjective judgment by the researcher. 
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1980), and similar metrics. Compared to Rumelt’s categorical measures, these are less reliant on 
subjective judgments about the relatedness of particular activities are related. The assignment of 
SIC codes to activities by the Census Bureau does of course involve some subjectivity, of course, 
but the subjective component is consistent across studies that use SIC codes to compute related-
ness. SIC-based measures also allow relatedness to be measured in intervals. The 2-, 3- and 4-
digit levels in the SIC system are treated as points on an underlying scale of relatedness, and 
arithmetic values are assigned to the distances. 
However, the use of distances in the SIC system also introduces problems. It assumes that in-
dustries are homogenous within category levels, which is problematic if the breadth of the indus-
try classifications vary, as is likely (Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Rumelt 1982). It also assumes 
that industries equally distant within the SIC hierarchy are equally dissimilar. 
Most important for present purposes, however, SIC-based measurements are no better than 
categorical measures in capturing of indivisibilities and transaction costs.4 In other words, even if 
distance among SIC codes is a good proxy for resource substitutability, these measures will tend 
to exaggerate relatedness. Foss and Christensen (2001) also point out that SIC-based procedures 
have an implicit bias towards economies of scope and thus are unlikely to capture dynamic com-
plementarities, suggesting that this type of relatedness is prone to be underestimated. For these 
reasons, continuous SIC-based measures may be ineffective in capturing the relevant kinds of 
relatedness.  
In sum, both categorical and continuous distance-based relatedness measures are problematic. 
The measurement explanation suggests that this is the reason for the mixed and often contradic-
                                                 
4 A study that does consider excess capacity is Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991). 
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tory findings in the empirical literature on relatedness. Below we propose an alternative measure, 
survivor-based relatedness, that mitigates these concerns.  
 
A SURVIVOR-BASED APPROACH TO RELATEDNESS 
Before turning the empirical tests we introduce an alternative measure of relatedness. The 
ideal measure features three characteristics. First, it should allow us to distinguish firm-specific 
(idiosyncratic) relatedness from relatedness that is a general property of the relationship between 
a given pair of industries. Second, it should form a useful benchmark for evaluating the potential 
problems with the conventional measures. Third, it should allow us to distinguish between effi-
ciency and non-efficiency explanations. Here we present a survivor-based measure (SBM) of 
relatedness that we think can perform all these tasks.  
The SBM is based on the survivor principle (SP). The core of the SP is that the competitive 
process screens for efficiency, and does so well enough that a sample of competitive firms will be 
dominated by the decisions or behaviors that are efficient (at least in a comparative sense (Al-
chian, 1950: 211)).5 Two key processes ensure. One is that firms making negative profits will, 
unless some corrective measure is taken, lose resources and ultimately become extinct, while 
firms making positive profits will acquire resources and grow. The second assumption is that the 
desire for profit provides a strong incentive for the less successful firms to imitate the more suc-
cessful firms. While few believe that the competitive process performs this screening perfectly,6 
research in industrial organization, organizational economics, and strategic management suggest 
that it can be highly effective. After all, theories or hypotheses about what is efficient are rou-
                                                 
5 For the view that the competitive process creates outcomes that are optimizing, see Friedman (1953). 
6 Friedman (1953) is a possible exception. 
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tinely tested by measuring what firms actually do, which indicates a belief in the basic conjecture 
of the SP. Examples include empirical tests of transaction cost analysis, where the hypothesis that 
vertical integration is more efficient than market governance when asset specificity is high is 
typically tested by measuring whether firms actually integrate when assert specificity is high 
(Shelanski and Klein, 1995; David and Hahn 2004; Klein, 2005).7 We also recognize it from 
agency theory where hypotheses about the relative efficiency of alternative contracts are tested by 
measuring which contracts firms actually employ (e.g. Anderson, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985; Zenger 
and Marshall, 2000). And we recognize it from studies of diversification within the strategic 
management literature, where for example hypotheses about what constitutes efficient patterns of 
diversification are tested by measuring their consistency with actual patterns of diversification 
(e.g. Farjoun, 1994; Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991; Silverman, 1999). 
If the survivor principle holds, relatedness can be measured by observing what industries are 
most often combined by firms in competitive markets. In other words, related activities are de-
fined as those most often performed together. Specifically, we estimate how much the frequen-
cies of actual combinations of 4-digit SIC industries deviate from what one would expect if di-
versification patterns were random. We take this difference to constitute a survivor-based meas-
ure of the relatedness between a pair of industries.  
The SBM offers several potential advantages. First, it incorporates the knowledge of those 
making portfolio decisions, presumably those with the best knowledge of the relevant benefits 
and costs of combinations. Even if this knowledge is imperfect, or firms are rife with agency 
                                                 
7 Some newer papers in the empirical transaction cost literature do not assume the SP, but rather employ a two-stage 
procedure in which in which the relationship between transactional characteristics and governance structure is 
endogenously chosen in the first stage, then used to explain performance in the second stage. Silverman, Nickerson 
and Freeman (1997), for example, show that transaction cost efficiency is positively correlated with firm survival in 
the for hire trucking industry, while Bigelow (2001) examines outsourcing arrangements in the U.S. automobile 
industry and finds that transactions that are appropriately aligned tend to last longer than inappropriately organized 
ones. 
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problems, these decisions have been screened by the competitive process, which tends to reverse 
poor decisions. Second, among the feasible alternatives, the survivor-based approach is holistic 
and flexible. It is holistic in the sense that it potentially captures all aspects of relatedness that are 
important for competitive outcomes, and flexible in the sense that it allows the causes of related-
ness to vary across situations. As such, while the survivor-based approach makes no attempt to 
pinpoint what relatedness is, it is potentially useful for studying what relatedness does—i.e., how 
relatedness influences other variables of interest (performance, entry mode, financing decisions, 
organizational parameters, etc.).8  
For our purposes the survivor-based approach has additional advantages. First, it potentially 
allows us to distinguish between firm-specific relatedness and general, inter-industry relatedness. 
This is because the SBM for a given firm is constructed from information about surviving combi-
nations (of industries) in other firms, in a period immediately preceding the study period. If relat-
edness is firm specific, the experiences of other firms should not reveal useful information about 
the benefits of similar combinations for the firm in question. This provides an opportunity to 
evaluate the idiosyncrasy interpretation. Second, the SBM can shed light on the size of measure-
ment problems. If substituting the SBM for the conventional SIC-based measures of relatedness 
increases our ability to explain the variables that relatedness supposedly affects, this suggests that 
SIC-based measures are not capturing these effects effectively. This allows us to test the meas-
urement interpretation. Finally, we can test the skeptic interpretation by examining if combina-
tions are driven by factors other than efficiency, even when using the SBM to capture relatedness.   
                                                 
8 Survivor-based measures could potentially help explain what relatedness is, however, by using measures of survi-
vor-based relatedness as the dependent variable, and examining hypotheses about causes of relatedness (i.e. variables 
that explain relatedness). 
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Having presented the potential advantages of this approach, we do acknowledge that deci-
sion-makers make mistakes, or fail to act in firm owners’ interests, and the competitive selection 
process is not perfect. For this reason, a survivor-based measure will include noise. Critics of the 
SP believe this noise is substantial (Elster, 1989; Hodgson, 1993; Winter 1971). All measures of 
relatedness are noisy, however. The more interesting question is whether a SBM is more or less 
noisy than feasible alternatives. The best judge of this is data.  
Our approach here is based on a procedure originally developed by Teece, et al. (1994). Let 
the universe of diversified firms consist of K firms, each active in two or more of I industries. Let 
Cik = 1 if firm k is active in industry i. The number of industries participated in by firm k is mk = 
ΣCi ik and the number of diversified firms present in industry i is ni = ΣkC . Let Jik ij be the number 
of diversified firms active in both industries i and j, such that Jij = Σk CikCjk. Thus Jij is a count of 
how often industries i and j are actually combined within the same firm. Jij will be larger if indus-
tries i and j are related, but will also increase with n  and ni j. To remove the effect of the size of 
industries i and j, the number Jij is compared with the number of expected combinations if diver-
sification patterns were random. 
The random diversification hypothesis can be operationalized as a hypergeometric situation 
where a sample of size ni is drawn (without replacement) from a population of K firms. Those 
chosen are considered active in industry i. A second independent sample of size nj is then drawn 
from the population the population of K firms. Those chosen are considered active in industry j. 
The number xij of firms active in both i and j is then a hypergeometric random variable with 
population K, special members n  and sample size ni j. The distribution function for this variable is 
then: 
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A standardized measure of the relatedness between industries i and j is then constructed based 
on the difference between Jij and μij in the following fashion: 
 
ij
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The measure SRij is thus a standardized measure of how much the actual number of combina-
tions exceeds expected combinations under the random diversification hypothesis. With this fun-
damental measure of the relatedness between a pair of businesses it is possible to compute vari-
ous relatedness measures. In this paper we focus on a measure that captures the weighted average 
relatedness of the focal industry i to all other businesses in the parent portfolio.9 Assume a diver-
sified firm that participates in m industries. Its business in industry j has sales of s  and survivor-j
                                                 
9 We have experimented with several other survivor based measures. One alternative does not consider how related 
the focal industry i is to all other business in the corporate portfolio, but how related it is to the two closest neighbor-
ing businesses of the parent. Yet, another focuses on the relationship between the focal business and the parents core 
business. Using these alternative measures reproduces substantively similar results (Reference withheld). 
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based relatedness SRij with industry i. The weighted average survivor-based relatedness (SURV-
TOT  ) of the target industry i to all other businesses in the firm is then defined as: i
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A parallel measure based on SIC distances can be obtained as follows: 
 
∑
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Where  dij = 2   if i and j are in the same 3-digit SIC codes 
 dij = 1   if i and j are in different 3-digit, but the same 2 digit SIC codes 
 dij = 0   if i and j are in different 2-digit SIC codes 
 
TEST 1: REVEALED PREFERENCES 
Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis uses decision-makers’ revealed preferences to see whether particular 
combinations are systematically chosen, or whether relatedness is treated by market participants 
as idiosyncratic and firm specific. Since the measure SURVTOTi is built on a procedure that ex-
tracts information about relatedness from other firms’ actions, this measure should not incorpo-
rate the firm-specific components of relatedness. Put differently, if the idiosyncracy interpretation 
is correct, SURVTOT  should be a poor predictor of entry. Thus we have: i
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H1: SURVTOT  is a poor predictor of the entry decisions of diversified firms. i
 
The second hypothesis examines the measurement interpretation. If SURVTOTi is a useful 
predictor of entry decisions (i.e., H1 is not supported), we can ask what the revealed preferences 
of decision makers indicate about the usefulness of the conventional SIC-based measures. If 
SURVTOT  explains entry decisions significantly better than SICTOTi i , then the forms of related-
ness that decision makers acting upon is poorly captured by SIC-based approaches. If the meas-
urement interpretation is correct we should have: 
 
 explains the probability of entry significantly better than SICTOTH2: SURVTOTi i
 
Methods Test 1 
Testing H1 and H2 involves two distinct empirical operations. First we calculate the survivor-
based measure of relatedness SRij for all possible pairs of industries in the US economy. Using 
this measure we calculate the variable SURVTOTi for any specific business belonging to any spe-
cific parent, and for any potential destination industry for any given parent. The second empirical 
operation is to test our hypotheses linking SURVTOT  and SICTOTi i to the probability of a given 
parent entering a given industry. 
Calculating SRij. To calculate SRij we used the AGSM/Trinet Large Establishment Database 
(Trinet). The Trinet database contains records of all US establishments with more than 20 em-
ployees, including variables such as 4-digit SIC code, corporate ownership, and sales.10 By ag-
                                                 
10 The Trinet database contains some sales figures that are imputed from multiplying employee counts with average 
industry sales per employee. To examine whether this constitutes a substantial source of error for our sample, we 
correlated the sales data from Trinet with Compustat data. This resulted in a correlation of 0,893 which indicates that 
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gregating the establishments for each parent in each four digit SIC code, and the different four 
digit SIC codes for each parent, and different parents for each 4-digit SIC industry, we are able to 
get a comprehensive picture of diversification patterns in the US economy. Comparison with the 
Census of Manufacturers indicate that Trinet contains 95% of all establishments it should (Voigt, 
1993), and that omissions are most likely for small firms (which are less likely to be diversified).  
The primary measure of SRij is calculated from the Trinet files of 1981, using all recorded 
firms active in two or more 4-digit SIC codes as a basis. After deleting single business firms, 
government owned and non-profit industries, this results in a total of 13,164 diversified firms, 
active in 929 different industries, covering a total of 57,647 individual businesses. Of the 431,056 
possible industry pairs, 122,105 are observed. The measure of SRij between the observed industry 
pairs ranges from –7.97 to 93.55 with a mean of 4.33 and a standard deviation of 5.06. We also 
calculate SRij for industry pairs that were not combined by 1981, because some of these where 
combined in the subsequent periods where we observed entry or non-entry, and because some of 
the randomly chosen non-entries created a need to calculate SRij for industry pairs that were never 
combined. (For unobserved combinations, we simply set the number of observed combinations 
(J ) to zero in the formula for calculating SRij ij.) Based on these calculations of SRij, we calculate 
measures of SURVTOT  and SURVNBORi i by following the procedures described in the previous 
section. 
Sample for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. The sample for testing H1 and H2 is derived as fol-
lows. We start with all 13,164 diversified firms in Trinet. To obtain the necessary data for the 
variables of interest, Trinet data are merged with financial data from Compustat database. Since 
the parent identity numbers in these two databases are different, the matching had to be done al-
                                                                                                                                                              
the sales data in Trinet are of acceptable quality. The problem of imputed sales data is likely to be largest for the 
smallest firms in the Trinet database (which are omitted from our sample). 
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phanumerically by parent name. Spelling differences between the two databases result in undis-
putable matches for 854 companies that had entries in all the years needed to compute the vari-
ables. To check that our sample is an unbiased sample of Compustat firms, we compare the aver-
age sales of our sample of matched firms to the average sales of the relevant population of diver-
sified firms in the Trinet database, and find that the difference in sample means is not statistically 
significant.11  
We imposed three further restrictions on our sample. First, we remove all firms with sales be-
low $10 million. Second, we remove firms that where sold or liquidated in their entirety between 
1981 and 1985. Third, we remove firms that did not enter at least one new 4-digit SIC code be-
tween 1981 and 1985. This reduces the sample to 145 firms. These 145 firms operated 4,582 
businesses in 724 different 4-digit SIC codes in 1981. They entered 1,202 industries between 
1981 and 1985, exited 1,118 industries, and remained in 3,464 industries throughout the period.  
To test our hypotheses we included all the 1,202 instances of entry, but rather than using the 
entire sample of non-entries, we randomly select a matched sample of non-entries. State-based 
sampling has been suggested as preferable to a pure random sample when a population is over-
whelmingly characterized by one state, and will provide unbiased and consistent coefficients for 
all variables except the constant term (McFadden & Manski, 1981). Adjusting for 26 cases for 
which data were missing, this resulted in a final sample of a total of 2,378 observations, 1,202 
entries and 1,176 non-entries.  
Statistical methods. To test Hypotheses 1 and 2 we develop a model of the relationship be-
tween the probability of entry and relatedness, which controls for other potential motives for en-
                                                 
11 The mean sales of the firms in our matched sample is 63,713 with a standard deviation of 62,907. The mean of the 
relevant population in the Trinet database is 51,213, with a standard deviation of 51,587. The slightly larger size of 
the firms in our sample is probably due to the fact Compustat only includes publicly traded firms, while Trinet con-
tains public and private firms. Publicly traded firms are on average larger than privately held firms, which means that 
using Compustat data will tend increase average firm size compared to using Trinet data alone. 
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try such as exploiting market power or joining a high-growth or high-return industry, and to re-
duce the risk that the performance of one or more of the presented relatedness measures are in-
flated or deflated because of associations with “other” variables. The general model is the follow-
ing:  
 
P (Entry=1) = β1 + β2 (industry growth) + β3 (industry concentration) + β4 (industry profitabil-
ity) + β5 (parent size) + β6 (parent diversity) + β7 (parent relatedness) + ε. 
 
Variables 
Industry growth. Industry growth is widely assumed to affect industry attractiveness favora-
bly, because it allows firms to grow without having to capture customers from competitors. Thus, 
industry growth tends to soften competitive rivalry and raise the average profitability. Such a 
relationship has been confirmed in numerous empirical studies (i.e. Kwoka & Ravenscraft, 1986; 
Salinger, 1984; Schmalensee, 1989). High growth may therefore function as a substitute for close 
relatedness in the eyes of a decision maker who is concerned with post entry performance. In 
addition, decision makers may as discussed earlier obtain private benefits from growth, which 
may create a bias towards entering high growth industries. For these reasons one would expect a 
positive relationship between the growth of an industry, and the probability of entry. The variable 
industry growth is derived by estimating the growth in percent of industry sales between 1981 
and 1985, as reported in Trinet. 
Industry concentration. Industry concentration is usually assumed to have a positive rela-
tionship with industry profitability (Bain, 1956; Porter, 1980); scale economies and other sources 
of market power presumably reduce the threat from potential entrants, allowing incumbents more 
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room to raise prices without inviting entry. Moreover, incumbents in concentrated markets are 
more likely to retaliate against potential entrants (e.g., by reciprocal entry). These considerations 
suggest a negative relationship between industry concentration and the probability of entry. The 
variable industry concentration is derived by estimating the 4-firm concentration ratio of each 
industry for 1981, based on Trinet Data.  
Industry profitability. The relationship between entry and industry profitability is ambiguous. 
High profitability invites entry, but profitability is more likely when entry barriers are high 
(Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982); the net effect could go either way. To control for industry 
profitability we calculate a measure of the median return on assets (ROA) for each industry over 
the 1980–82 period. To calculate profitability we use all single-business firms in the Compustat 
industrial file for each 4-digit SIC industry, along with corresponding segments in the Compustat 
business segment file. Because of incomplete asset allocation, the profitability ratios in the seg-
ment file are systematically higher than the profitability ratios in the corporate database, so we 
standardize the observations from each database by computing them as percentage deviations 
from the database mean.12  
Parent size. Parent size proxies for the parent’s financial, managerial, and other resources. 
For a given level of relatedness, a large firm may be more willing and able to attempt entry, so 
we expect a positive relationship between parent size and the probability of entry. Parent size is 
measured as the total sales of the parent in 1981, based on Trinet data. 
Parent diversity. The parent’s level of diversification provides information about its strategy 
and motives. Firms active in many SIC codes may be following a strategy of broad or unrelated 
diversification, either to reduce risk, exploit internal capital markets, or leverage general re-
                                                 
12 Following Berger and Ofek (1995), we define industries at the 4-digit SIC level where five or more observations 
are available at that level, at the 3-digit SIC level if five or more observations are available only at that level, and at 
the 2-digit SIC level if five or more observations are available only at that level. 
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sources such as the ability to manage complex organizations. Such firms are more likely to enter 
additional industries, ceteris paribus. We thus expect a positive relationship between parent di-
versity and the probability of entry for any level of relatedness. Parent diversity is measured as 
the number of SIC codes for the parent in 1981, based on Trinet data. 
Relatedness. Hypothesis 1 and 2 employ two measures of relatededness, SURVTOTi and 
SICTOTi, both have been presented above, but we reiterate that they capture the sales-weighted 
average relatedness of the target industry i to all other businesses in the parent k. They are based 
on the survivor-based and SIC-based approach respectively.  
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable is an indicator variable set equal to one if the 
parent entered a new 4-digit SIC code between 1981 and 1985 and zero otherwise. The Trinet 
database is used to identify entries and non-entries. 
Variable definitions and data sources are summarized in Table 1 below, while Table 2 shows 
the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients for all independent variables. 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Results 
The results from three logistic regressions are presented in Table 3. Model 1 contains control 
variables only. Model 2 contains control variables plus the survivor-based measure SURVTOTi. 
Model 3 contains control variables plus the equivalent SIC-based measure SICTOTi. Hypothesis 
1, taking the idiosyncrasy interpretation as the point of departure, predicted that the coefficient on 
SURVTOTi would be insignificant, and that model 2 would not explain the probability of entry 
significantly better than model 1.  
[Table 3 about here] 
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As shown in Table 3, H1 is not supported by the data. The coefficient on SURVTOTi is posi-
tive and highly significant, with a higher Wald score than any of the other independent variables 
(model 2). Moreover, the ability to explain the probability of entry increases substantially when 
SURVTOTi is added to a model with control variables only (moving from model 1 to model 2). 
The model χ2 improves from 50.56 to 744.1, an improvement that is statistically significant be-
yond the 0.001 level. The two pseudo-R2 measures increase from 2.1% to 26.9% (Cox and Snell 
R2) and 2.8% to 35.8% (Nagelkerke R2). The ability to predict entries and non-entries also in-
creases from 55.3% to 74.4%. To the extent that the revealed preferences of the decision makers 
in our sample reflect information about relatedness, we conclude that relatedness does not appear 
to be mainly a firm specific variable. Decision makers in different firms appear to reach strik-
ingly similar conclusion about the attractiveness of different combinations.  
We now turn to H2, which takes the measurement interpretation as the point of departure. 
This hypothesis predicts that model 2 explains the probability of entry significantly better than 
model 3. As described above, the improvement in explanation can be interpreted as a measure of 
the magnitude of the measurement problems with the conventional SIC-based procedure. This, of 
course, requires that the explanatory power of the survivor-based measure SURVTOTi is not in-
flated for reasons unrelated to relatedness (a point we revisit below). Leaving this reservation 
temporarily aside, our revealed preferences data provide strong support for H2. All measures of 
model performance improve substantially when SURVTOTi is substituted for SICTOTi . The 
model χ2 improves from 227.26 to 744.1, an improvement that is statistically significant at the 
0.001 level. The two pseudo-R2 measures increase from 9.1% to 26.9% (Cox and Snell R2) and 
12.2% to 35.8% (Nagelkerke R2). These increases represent improvements of approximately 
195%. The ability to predict entries and non-entries also increases from 61.4% to 74.4%, an im-
provement of 119.2%. The SIC-based approach is not worthless in terms of explaining entry de-
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cisions, but it seems to capture a rather small share of the relatedness construct decision makers 
are acting upon. For other dependent variables and other samples, the portion captured by the 
SIC-measures may well be too small too allow significant and stable results. In sum we interpret 
this as providing preliminary support for the measurement interpretation. 
 
TEST 2: PERFORMANCE 
Hypotheses 
An important objection to the revealed preference data in test 1 is that relatedness should be 
evaluated with respect to performance, not decision making. One may argue from an idiosyncrasy 
position that it is not the choice of combinations that are idiosyncratic, it is the performance ob-
tained from them. If so, for the same reasons supporting H1, we would not expect SURVTOTi to 
contain much information about performance.13 The performance metric we use here is survival. 
We assume that the worse the post entry performance, the more likely that an entered business 
will be exited (i.e. the entry decision is reversed). This gives us: 
 
H3: SURVTOT  is a poor predictor of post entry survival i
 
In a similar fashion one may argue that the question of measurement problems is better evalu-
ated against a performance metric than decision making. Revealed preferences from observing 
decisions, reflects, at best, intentions and beliefs about performance outcomes. Differences in the 
ability to explain performance will therefore add to the credibility of the measurement hypothe-
                                                 
13 SURVTOTi is built on a procedure that extracts information about relatedness from other firms’ actions, therefore 
this measure should not be able to pick up the firm specific components of relatedness. 
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sis. Using the probability of survival as our performance metric, the measurement interpretation 
yields: 
 
 explains the probability of survival significantly better than SICTOTH4: SURVTOTi i
 
Methods Test 2 
We test Hypotheses 3 and 4 using a subsample of the sample used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
We cannot use the full sample of 1,202 entries for two reasons. First, 1987 is the last year for 
which we have Trinet data on industry participation, needed to determine if a firm is still active in 
an entered industry. Because the competitive process may take time to filter entry decisions, we 
restrict the sample to entries made between 1981 and 1983. This reduces the sample to 401 cases. 
Using data from 1987 to measure post-entry survival poses a further challenge. The SIC system 
was revised in 1987, and there is no unambiguous procedure for converting between the two ver-
sions of the SIC system. Fortunately, 609 of the 913 relevant 4-digit SIC codes14 were unchanged 
by the revision, and we restrict the sample to entries into these 609 industries. This further re-
duces our sample to 229 entries by 82 parents, all occurring between 1981 and 1983, for which 
their continued existence in 1987 could be unambiguously determined. Of these 229 entries 75 
were exited by 1987. 
We again use a logistic regression to test H3 and H4. The dependent variable is the probabil-
ity that an industry entered between 1981 and 1983 is exited by 1987. The general model is the 
following: P (exit=1) = β  + β1 2 (relatedness) + ε. The independent variables are the same two 
relatedness measures used to test H1and H2. We do not include control variables in these regres-
sions, since our main interest is the relative performance of the different relatedness measures. 
                                                 
14 SIC codes referring to public and non-profit industries are omitted.  
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However, as a robustness check, we repeated the analysis reported below using controls for in-
dustry growth, industry concentration, industry profitability, parent size, and parent diversity. The 
substantive findings remained unchanged.15
 
Results 
Table 4 presents the results of two logistic regression analyses. The column under the heading 
SURVTOT shows the regression output with SURVTOTi. as the independent variable, while the 
column under the heading SICTOT shows the regression output when SICTOTi is the independent 
variable. H3, taking the idiosyncrasy interpretation as the point of departure, predicts that the 
coefficient on SURVTOTi will not be significant, and consequently, that the model with this vari-
able included will poorly explain the probability of survival. As can be seen by table 4, this hy-
pothesis is not supported by the data. The coefficient on SURVTOTi is negative (i.e. SURVTOT 
decreases the probability of exit) and significant at the 0.001 level. The model χ2 is 23.47, also 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level. The two pseudo-R2 measures are 9,7% (Cox and Snell 
R2) and 13.6% (Nagelkerke R2). We interpret this as additional evidence against the idiosyncrasy 
interpretation, since there is a component of relatedness that is not firm specific and is valuable 
not only for predicting entry decision, but also for predicting performance outcomes. 
Hypothesis 4 is based on the measurement interpretation, predicting that the model containing 
SURVTOTi explains the probability of survival significantly better than the model containing 
SICTOT . As can be seen from table 4, H4 is supported. Replacing SICTOT  with SURVTOTi i i 
increases the model χ2 from 5.90 to 23.47 and the two pseudo-R2 measures increase from 2.5% to 
9.7% (Cox and Snell R2) and from 3.5% to 13.6% (Nagelkerke R2). While the model with 
SICTOT  is not without any explanatory power, these increases in model performance indicate i
                                                 
15 Regressions with control variables included are available from the authors. 
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that the SIC-based measure has a relatively poor ability to capture the aspects of relatedness that 
are important for performance outcomes. The relationship between the two measures is further 
explored in table 5. This table shows that adding SURVTOT  to the model containing SICTOTi i as 
a regressor, the coefficient on SICTOT  is no longer statistically significant, while SICTOTi i does 
not add any explanatory power to the model including only SURVTOTi . In other words, the 
measure SURVTOT  seems to contain all the explanatory power of the measure SICTOTi i, and it 
also adds substantial explanatory power not contained in this measure. The two measures are 
therefore substitutes, not complements, in terms of capturing relatedness.  
In summary, our data thus far are not consistent with the idiosyncrasy interpretation, while 
they fit a measurement interpretation well. We therefore put the idiosyncrasy interpretation aside, 
and turn our focus to the skeptic interpretation. The essential question arising from the skeptic 
interpretation is whether the results presented this far can be driven by other mechanisms than 
efficiency. In particular, we should be wary of mechanisms that could spuriously inflate the per-
formance of the survivor-based measures versus the SIC-based measures, because such mecha-
nisms could invalidate our interpretation of the results from the first two tests. 
 
THE SKEPTIC INTERPRETATION VERSION I: HERD BEHAVIOR 
The entry decisions we observe may reflect herd behavior rather than efficiency. “Rational” 
herding occurs when decision-makers suppress their private information, either because making a 
bad decision is less costly when others make the same decision (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990) or 
because decision makers believe that the decisions of others reflect valuable private information 
that other decision makers have (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992). 
Either way, entry decisions may be based on the actions of others, rather than superior private 
knowledge about which activities are related to each other. Our survivor-based measures of relat-
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edness are particularly susceptible to contamination from herd behavior, as they measure what 
combinations firms in the same industries as the focal firm have chosen previously. SIC-based 
approaches, on the other hand, are based on standardized distances in the SIC system and are 
little influenced by the behavior of other firms.16 Support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 may therefore 
be driven by herd behavior, rather than a superior ability to capture relatedness. 
However, a herd behavior interpretation is not consistent with the findings from the perform-
ance data in test 2. If the survivor-based measure primarily reflects herding, rather than effi-
ciency, we would expect it to be a good predictor of entry but a poor predictor of post-entry per-
formance (i.e. survival). Our underlying assumption here is that once entry has occurred, com-
petitive forces will set in and begin screening the good decisions from the bad. The worse the 
post-entry performance, the more likely that an entered business will be exited. As our findings 
regarding Hypotheses 3 and 4 show, relatedness is indeed useful for predicting survival, and the 
survivor-based measure performs better than its SIC-based equivalent. The performance of the 
survivor-based measure is therefore difficult to dismiss as merely a better way to capture herding 
tendencies.  
A possible counterargument is that exit decisions may also reflect herding, contaminating our 
measure of post-entry performance. We think this concern is misplaced, however. It implies that 
those firms least sensitive to herding before entry (those that chose rare combinations) become 
the most sensitive to herding after entry. The reversal of a previous entry decision seems more 
likely to be the result of performance below expectations than a sudden change of strategy. The 
herding version of the skeptic interpretation is therefore not able to convince us to change our 
main conclusion from tests 1 and 2, namely that a measurement interpretation fits the data best. 
                                                 
16 Many industries that are close in the SIC system are never actually combined, while many seemingly distant indus-
tries are frequently combined. 
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THE SKEPTIC INTERPRETATION VERSION II: MUTUAL FORBEARANCE 
The mutual forbearance hypothesis suggests that contact between firms across markets in-
duces implicit or explicit agreements to refrain from aggressive competition (Edwards, 1955). 
Contact between firms across multiple markets enables a firm to respond to an aggressive action 
by a multipoint rival in one market with a retaliatory action in another market. Such behavior 
increases the potential costs of aggressive moves, leading to a less vigorous state of competition 
than what would have occurred without multi-market contact (Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985). 
Firms may therefore prefer to enter industries where they will meet existing competitors as a 
mean of establishing mutual forbearance (Hypotheses 1 and 2), or they may refrain from exiting a 
weak position in one industry (Hypothesis 3 and 4) not because they reap efficiency gains from 
relatedness, but because they must remain in that industry to dissuade rivals from acting aggres-
sively in other industries. There is some empirical support for the claim that the creation and ex-
ploitation of mutual forbearance affects the behavior and patterns of diversification (Greve and 
Baum, 2001). 
This scenario is particularly worrying for two reasons. First, survivor-based measures of re-
latedness are particularly prone to incorporate motives of mutual forbearance because they are 
built by counting the frequencies of multi-market contact across industries. SIC-based measures, 
on the other hand, are probably less sensitive to such motives, because they are not constructed 
on the basis of counts of multi-market contact. Second, unlike the herd-behavior version of the 
skeptic interpretation, the mutual forbearance version is consistent with the findings in both test 1 
and 2 above. To explore this possibility we therefore submit a third and final test.  
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Test 3: Mutual Forbearance  
If diversification patterns primarily reflect attempts to establish or protect gains from mutual 
forbearance, rather than increase efficiency, we expect relatedness to be most effective at predict-
ing entry into highly concentrated industries. The reason is that the mutual forbearance motive 
requires a minimum level of concentration to be plausible. In fragmented markets, existing or 
potential competitors without other markets to protect can force multi-market firms into vigorous 
competition. By the same reasoning, if the superior performance of the survivor based measure is 
due to contamination from mutual forbearance, we would expect the superiority of the survivor-
based measure hold for entry into fairly concentrated industries, but no difference between the 
two measures with respect to the most fragmented markets. The mutual forbearance story there-
fore gives the following hypotheses: 
 
H5: SURVTOTi will be a better predictor of entry when industry concentration in the 
 destination industry is high, than when it is low. 
 
H6: SURVTOTi will outperform SICTOTi in terms of predicting entry when concentration in 
 the destination industry is high, but not when it is low. 
 
Methods Test 3 
To test Hypotheses 5 and 6 we use the same sample of 1,202 entries and 1,176 randomly cho-
sen non-entries between 1981 and 1985 used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. We divide the sample 
into two equally sized subsamples, one containing the most concentrated industries and one con-
taining the least concentrated industries, and re-run on each sample the logistic regressions used 
to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. As before, the general model for the two sets of logistic regression 
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analyses is P (entry = 1) = β  + β1 2 (industry growth) + β3 (industry concentration) + β4 (industry 
profitability) + β5 (parent size) + β6 (parent diversity) + β7 (parent relatedness) + ε. The dependent 
variable is an indicator variable set equal to one if the parent entered a new 4-digit SIC code be-
tween 1981 and 1985 and zero otherwise. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Table 6 presents regression results for both the high and low concentration subsamples. Hy-
pothesis 5 predicts that the model with controls and SURVTOTi will perform better for the high-
concentration subsample. As can be seen from Table 6 this hypothesis is not supported. In fact 
the model with SURVTOTi performed better for the low-concentration subsample both in terms of 
the size of the coefficient (0.37 versus 0.43) and in terms of the increase in model χ2 compared to 
a model with controls only (327,06 versus 365,31). The latter difference is statistically significant 
on the 0.01 level.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Hypothesis 6 predicts that the relative superiority of the model with SURVTOTi over the 
model with SICTOTi. will hold for the high-concentration sample, but not the low-concentration 
sample. The results in table 6 contradict Hypothesis 6. Not only is the survivor-based measure 
superior to the SIC-based measure in both subsamples, but the superiority of the survivor-based 
measure is bigger in the low-concentration subsample. This is seen most clearly from the changes 
in model χ2 2 from model 2 to model 3. The changes in model χ  are not only positive and highly 
significant for both subsamples, they are actually larger for the low-concentration subsample than 
for the high-concentration subsample. In other words, the advantage of substituting survivor-
based measures for SIC-based measures is greatest where the mutual forbearance interpretation is 
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least plausible. Overall, this leads us to reject the mutual forbearance version of the skeptic inter-
pretation as a major influence on firms’ diversification decisions, and also that contamination 
from mutual forbearance can explain the superior performance of the survivor based measure. 
We therefore uphold our previous interpretation that the superiority of the survivor based meas-
ure SURVTOTi is an indication of serious measurement problems with the conventional SIC-
based approach to measuring relatedness.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study is an attempt to shed empirical light on possible explanations for the mixed and 
unstable findings regarding a core hypothesis of the RBV; that related diversification is more 
efficient than unrelated diversification. We have isolated three candidate explanations. One is a 
measurement interpretation, arguing that inter-industry relatedness exists and is important, but 
has been poorly captured in much of the existing work. Another is the idiosyncrasy interpretation, 
which holds that the bulk of the empirical work does not take the RBV far enough in the sense of 
recognizing firm heterogeneity. Under this view, very little explanatory power should be ex-
pected when relatedness is studied as a general property of the relationship between industries. 
The third and final candidate is the skeptic interpretation which holds that the RBV’s emphasis 
on (boundedly) rational pursuit of efficiency gains is misplaced. Other motives and/or other be-
havioral assumptions are needed to develop an empirically successful theory.  
Our results suggests, in contrast to the skeptic interpretation, that there are significant and 
stable efficiency effects of relatedness, and that decision makers do act in a manner consistent 
with the pursuit of such effects. Contrary to the idiosyncrasy interpretation, these efficiency ef-
fects are not entirely firm specific. Thus it seems meaningful to speak of inter-industry related-
ness. Moreover, we have documented the superior performance of survivor-based measures over 
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SIC-based measures. On the whole, we argue that measurement problems explain the mixed and 
unstable findings in the empirical literature using relatedness as an independent variable. While 
SIC-based measures do contain some information about relatedness, they seem to lack the sensi-
tivity to detect anything but the very strongest relationships. The diversification decision is ap-
parently a case in which the relationship is sufficiently strong for SIC-based measures to find it. 
The entry reversal decision, on the other hand, is more subtle, such that SIC-based measures may 
or may not detect a relationship, depending on which SIC-based measures one uses, sample size, 
sample composition, etc. Elsewhere we document a positive relationship between relatedness and 
bidder returns in mergers and acquisitions when a survivor-based measure is used, but no detect-
able relationship when SIC-based measures are used (reference withheld). This leads us to sus-
pect that much of the confusion surrounding the role of relatedness will vanish if measures better 
capable of screening for the relevant theoretical conditions are employed. In sum, while the con-
ventional RBV of diversification has been supported by our data, the most common operationali-
zation of the RBV has been questioned. 
The paper can also be read as an evaluation of the survivor-based approach to measuring re-
latedness. This approach allows the actions of firms in competitive markets to tell us (research-
ers) which industries are related to which, instead of imposing on the data some a priori view of 
relatedness. Rather than letting the SIC system or the researcher be the judge of what is related to 
what, we rely on the wisdom of local decision makers and the screening function of the competi-
tive process. Of course, this procedure also means that we will not know the causes of relatedness 
in each particular instance, and hence will know little more about what relatedness is.17 If this 
procedure is superior to conventional approaches, however, we may know much more about what 
                                                 
17 Although indirectly, the procedure may also be helpful for this purpose. One can for example let measures of sur-
vivor-based relatedness be the dependent variable, and examine hypotheses about causes of relatedness (i.e. for ex-
ample, t explain relatedness).  
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relatedness does, regarding its effects on dependent variables of interest (i.e. performance, 
growth, entry mode, financing, organizational choice, etc.). 
To further validate the ability of survivor-based measures to capture relatedness it would be 
useful to complement the existing evidence with data from other periods and to link the survivor-
based measures to behaviors and characteristics other than entry and entrant survival. One possi-
bility is to see how well survivor-based measures explain additional performance measures such 
as revenue growth, return on assets, Tobin’s q, or other measures of market value. While the re-
search presented here uses the industry-pair as the unit of analysis, it is possible to compute aver-
age relatedness scores for individual firms as well.  
In any case, the survivor-based approach does not (and should not) represent the end of the 
discussion about how to measure relatedness. Ideally, it would be preferable with measurement 
procedures that explicitly screen for the theoretical conditions associated with the concept (cf. the 
discussion in the second section above). However, as this seems infeasible at present, we must 
choose between imperfect alternatives. Our research suggests that the survivor-based approach 
may be a very strong contestant among these less-than-perfect alternatives.  
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TABLE 1 
 
Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
 Var D Data ce iable efinition Sour
 Industry 
Growth 
Salesgrowth in industry i between 1981 and 1985 Trinet 
 
4-firm concentration ratio in 1981 in industry i Indu
Con  
stry 
centration
Trinet 
 
Indu
Prof
Industry median ROA 1980–82 in industry i Compustat stry 
itability  Pare
Size
nt Total sales of the parent in 1981 Trinet 
 
 Pare
Div
Number of  1981 nt 
ersity 
 4-digit SIC codes participated in by parent in Trinet 
SUR Weighted average survivor-based relatedness of industry i to all industries in the portfolio  Trinet VTOT  
of the parent 
SIC Weighted average SIC-based relate n the portfolio of the parent 
 
TOT dness of industry i to all industries i Trinet 
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aTABLE 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Coefficients of Independent Variablesa  
 
Mean SD Industry Industry Industry Parent Parent SURVTOT Variables   
Growth concentr. Profitab. size diversity 
           
  Industry variables         
1 Industry growth 0.60
  
1.64        
  
2 Industry concentration 32.21 21.42 0.15**       
  3 Industry profitability 0.09 0.46 0.01 −0.04**     
  
 Firm variables          
5 Parent size 48727 56790 0.00  0.05** −0.04*     
  
6 Parent diversity 39.81 22.55 −0.02 0.06** −0.05** 0.38**     
  Relatedness variables         
SURVTOT 8 3.41 4.43  0.00 − 0.06**  0.04* −0.08**  −0.09**   
  
SICTOT 9 0.069 0.181  −0.01  0.02  0.08** −0.07**  −0.08** 0.44**  
            
      
a
     
n = 2378 
†p < 0.1 
*p < 0.05 
**p < 0.01 
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aTABLE 3
 
Probability of Entry 
 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Ctrls Only Ctrls + Survtot Ctrls + Sictot   
 Beta Wald Beta Wald Beta Wald  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
an = 2378 
†p < 0.1 
*p < 0.05 
**p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Constant  0.39** 13.82 −0.84* 41.71   0.16† 2.17 
Industry growth  0.05* 3.99  0.06** 4.06  0.06* 4.90 
Industry concentration −0.01** 47.65 −0.01** 31.88  −0.02** 53.51 
Industry profitability −0.00 0.00 −0.13 1.43  −0.10 1.21 
Parent size  0.00 0.00  0.00* 4.85  0.00 0.63 
Parent diversity  0.00 0.38  0.00 0.33  0.00 0.64 
SURVTOT    0.40** 403.33   i
SICTOT     4.40** 99.94 i
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TABLE 3 (Cont.) a
 
Probability of Entry 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
 Ctrls Only Ctrls + Survtot Ctrls + Sictot  
 −2Log likelihood  3245.76  2552.23  3069.06 
 Model χ2  50.56**  744.09**  227.26** 
 2Δ χ  vs. model 1   693.53**  176.70**  
2Δ χ  model 2 vs. model 3   516.83** 
 
Cox and Snell R2  0.021  0.269  0.091  
 Nagelkerke R2  0.028  0.358  0.122 
 Correct classifications  55.3%  74.4%  61.4% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
an = 2378 
†p < 0.1 
*p < 0.05 
**p < 0.01 
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TABLE 4 
Probability of Exit 
 SURVTOT SICTOT 
Variable coefficient −0.16** −1.65* 
Wald statistic 16.64 4.31 
2Model χ 23.47** 5.90** 
−2 log likelihood 266.17 283.74 
Cox and Snell R2 0.097 0.025 
Nagelkerke R2 0.136 0.035 
 
 
 
an = 229 
†p < 0.1 
*p < 0.05 
**p < 0.01 
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 aTABLE 5
Models Containing Only SURVTOT, Only SICTOT, and Both 
SURVTOT only SICTOT only SURVTOT and SICTOT 
 Beta Wald Beta Wald Beta Wald 
SURVTOT −0.16** 16.64   −0.162** 13.252 
SICTOT   −1.653** 5.901 −0.030 0.01 
2Model χ 23.47** 5.90** 23.47 
−2 log likelihood 266.17 283.74 266.17 
Cox and Snell R2 0.097 0.025 0.097 
Nagelkerke R2 0.136 0.035 0.136 
 
an = 229 
†p < 0.1 
*p < 0.05 
**p < 0.01 
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 aTABLE 6
 
Probability of Entry 
 
Model 1. Controls only 2. Ctrs +survtot 3. Ctrs + sictot  
     
 Subsample (con- High conc Low conc High conc Low conc High conc Low conc 
 Beta(Wald) Beta(Wald) Beta(Wald) Beta(Wald) Beta(Wald) Beta(Wald)  
 
        
Constant 0.81** 
(16.93) 
0.21 −0.50* −0.83** 0.69** −0.03 
 (1.32) (4.40) (14.60) (11.13) (0.03) 
 Industry  0.04 0.12* 0.04 0.12* 0.04 0.13** 
(1.24) (4.87) (1.19) (4.56) (1.37) (6.33)  growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   an =1189 (subsample with high concentration)  
n = 1189 (subsample with low concentration) 
†p < 0.1 
*p < 0.05 
**p < 0.01 
Industry  
concentration 
−0.02** 
(34.03) 
−0.01 
(2.01) 
−0.02** 
(17.18) 
−0.03** 
(6.63) 
−0.02** −0.02†
(40.50) (2.80) 
Industry profit-
ability 
−0.06 
(0.20) 
0.08 
(0.36) 
−0.20 
(1.99) 
−0.02 
(0.02) 
−0.21† 0.03 
(2.63) (0.05) 
Parent  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.93) (4.78) (0.45) (0.15) size 
Parent  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (1.03) 0.09) (0.27) (0.00) (1.46) diversity 
SURVTOT   0.37** 0.43**   
(193.90) (209.16) 
SICTOT     4.59** 4.35** 
(56.35) (45.92) 
SURVNBOR       
SICNBOR       
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aTABLE 6 (Cont.)
 
Probability of Entry 
 
 
 Model 1. Controls only 2. Ctrs +survtot 3. Ctrs + sictot 
      
Subsample (concen- High conc Low conc High conc Low conc High conc Low conc  
Beta(Wald) Beta(Wald) Beta(Wald) Beta(Wald) Beta(Wald) Beta(Wald)   
        
 −2Log likelihood 1606.23 1630.52 1278.96 1265.20 1504.13 1551.13 
 Model χ2 36.48** 7.78 363.54** 373.10** 138.34** 87.17** 
 Cox and Snell R2 0.03 0.007 0.263 0.269 0.110 0.071 
 Nagelkerke R2 0.04 0.009 0.352 0.360 0.147 0.095 
 2Δ χ  vs. controls 
only 
  327.06** 365.31** 101.89** 79.38** 
 
 2Δ χ  model 2 vs. 
model 3 
   High concentration sample: 225.20**  
 Low concentration sample: 285.93**  
 
 
 
an =1189 (subsample with high concentration)  
n = 1189 (subsample with low concentration) 
†p < 0.1 
*p < 0.05 
**p < 0.01 
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